PRELIMINARY
REPORT:
FOLLOW-UP
WALLENBERG INVESTIGATION
Susan Ellen
Mesinai
I. INTRODUCTION:
In her analysis of the various
official and independent investigations into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg in the The New York Review of Books [1], Soviet expert Dr. Amy Knight’s concluded with
my statement: “If one places one’s ear to the ground and listens, one will
understand …that there is too much insistence, and has been over time, that
there is ‘nothing to be found’ and that this case is now ‘history’ – when in
fact the real investigation has barely begun.”
On the negative side, the reasons
for making such a statement remain the same as they were in January 2001 when
our reports were first presented to the international community. In spite of the remarkable degree of
cooperation shown by the Russian side, fundamental registries and files have
yet to be produced that would provide clear-cut yes/no answers to evaluate
reports of Raoul Wallenberg in the Soviet Gulag.[2] Although we were able to identify with
precision the numbered sentenced prisoners who might have been Wallenberg, his
driver or a fellow Hungarian – or ‘unoccupied cells’ which correspond to
eyewitness reports of Wallenberg in Vladimir Prison’s corpus 2 -- the Russians’
failure to identify those numbers or occupants and/or to produce the
relevant registries, isolation lists, or
corpus cards has essentially blocked the most direct course on our side to
determining Wallenberg’s fate.
The fact that the eyewitness
sightings for the past thirty years, classified in
Before launching on this
follow-up on-site search in
An
Objective Pursuit
On the positive side, however, there
is much to be said for the independent work that has emerged over the past
year, building upon the very important discoveries which were made during the
existence of the Swedish-Russian Working Group and in preparation for the
eyewitness, transport and medical studies.
We are at a critical crossroads for it is only now that we can begin
to launch a truly objective investigation, one which – if handled correctly and
with the proper cooperation – could come to fruition in a short amount of time.
That such an objective, cooperative
approach is now possible I attribute to the following factors:
1. The various analyses under the aegis of the
Swedish-Russian Working Group which have laid the foundation, or grid, for
evaluating any and all claims regarding sightings of Raoul Wallenberg, whether
they come from the side of the authorities or of former prisoners. Through extensive hard work and documentation
we have established a context – so that any eyewitness report or official claim
can be measured against the norm and/or exception in prison procedures and
regulations of that time. As this work
also clarified how key decisions related to the disappearance or execution of
an important prisoner were carried out by the highest collective level of leadership,
we are all the more confident that there exists a paper trail both for the
decision-making process and the carrying out of the final order.
There is now a widening public
perception that the evidence turned over by the Soviets/Russians [3]
is proof that some portion of Wallenberg’s personal and archival investigation
file must exist. Through my analysis related to the issue of possessions, we
face also the question of a prisoner’s debit/credit accounts as another
important portion of Wallenberg’s paper trail, at least until 1989 when his
currency was returned to the next of kin.
Should any of our work in the forthcoming follow up investigation
establish the place of death – we will need to consult the regional death
registries as well.
Most importantly, we have shown
that even if such Wallenberg files (the ‘smoking gun’) are not produced
voluntarily by the Russians, Wallenberg’s trail may be reconstructed through
the painstaking work of evaluating the eyewitness reports against official records.
To achieve this end, the Swedish government invested considerable funds not
only in supporting my research into the prisoner files but for the computerized
study of the cell occupancy of Corpus 2 during the 1945 – 1970 time period,
generated by former Vladimir prisoner Dr. Marvin W. Makinen and Ari Kaplan –
with the cooperation of the MVD. This
system has already shown how much can be achieved to verify eye witness reports
by systematically making use of the most basic prison procedures in a particular
setting and time period.[4] The findings published in the Makinen/Kaplan
independent report are only the ‘first fruits’ of this invaluable system the
Swedish-Russian Working Group constructed for ongoing use.[5] Unfortunately neither Marvin Makinen nor Ari
Kaplan have had the time to develop further applications so I, in my
independent work over the past year,
have gone over their findings and set forth new queries related to specific
sightings in the early Sixties, such as the Svartz/Myasnikov controversy and
the recently uncovered de Jaeger/Reydon testimony about a prisoner receiving
‘special treatment’ across the hall from them in 1962 whom they believe to be
Swedish. These will be implemented when
Ari Kaplan and I can schedule a trip to
The
‘bottom line’ for laying the foundation to evaluate the sightings and other
reports is that we, the independents, have been the first to make successful
use of the ‘empty’ or ‘unidentified spaces’ as a working tool. By gathering sufficient data and organizing
it in such a way that we were able to work the vacancies which noted an
‘exceptional prisoner’ against the norm, we have greatly narrowed the gap which
has kept us from the truth of Wallenberg’s fate. We have gone far – but not far enough. Further follow-up will narrow this even more,
but ultimately the final result continues to depend in very precise ways on
Russian cooperation.
2. For the first time in 57 years all the eyewitness
sightings of the 1945-1970 time period to be found on the Utrikesdepartementet
CD rams or produced by the independents
– are being systematized into one coherent system. First, they are
being entered into a computer data base to cluster in time and place, so that
the patterns of movement and standstill of the prisoner or prisoners believed
to be Wallenberg emerge more clearly.
What on the surface has appeared as scattered or random sightings – more
a reflection of their handling than their truth – may now prove to be a
long-overlooked sighting by many related and unrelated eyewitnesses.[6] This shows us which sightings to target and
also enables us to define the most straightforward steps for determining the
identity of the prisoner in question.
Secondly, each report is being considered as part of a synergy – in
depth on its own merits, in relation to our knowledge of the Gulag system, and
in relation to the other sightings. This
more scientific approach is very different than the investigation carried out
during the Cold War period when too many reports were discounted by skeptical
officials in the West with little-to-no knowledge of the Gulag whose only
criteria were the personal impression given by the witness and/or how the
Wallenberg case overall effected Swedish/Soviet policy considerations. To my view, this contributed to the great
emphasis on making an icon out of Raoul Wallenberg the humanitarian while
ignoring the signals sent to his Government that he was still in captivity and
requiring help.
Running an Investigation
from both a Practical and Political Perspective
In my speech “Only One Truth”,
presented to the U. S. Congressional International Relations Committee, the
Congressional Human Rights Caucus and the American Jewish Committee in
Washington on February 13, 2002, I made the following point: “What is tragic
is that no further attempts were made to cluster the eyewitness reports and
present them as evidence – after the initial success in 1955/56,” leading
to the Gromyko Memorandum. For the reversal of the Vishinsky Memorandum of
1947 (which claimed that Wallenberg was not to be found on Soviet territory) in
favor of the Gromyko came about precisely because returning prisoners of war
who sat with Wallenberg and his colleague, Vilmos Langfelder, confirmed each
other’s accounts. This occurred during
one of the most critical phases of the Cold War. Still the Swedish government submitted these
testimonies and the Soviets realized they were of such strength, they would
have to amend their position. Were these the only testimonies regarding
Wallenberg that reinforced and confirmed each other? By no means, as we will see in the tables in
Part III below. Nor, if the handling of the sightings had been systematic with
recognition of their judicial importance, would a computer have been necessary
to show that a number of unrelated witnesses (diverse sources) have seen a
prisoner they believe to be Wallenberg in the same time and place or
region. So why wasn’t an effort made to
continue to build and act upon the body of evidence pointing to Wallenberg
alive in the Soviet Gulag? Why give up
in a position of strength?
The Handling of Evidence
For this, or any investigation
to work effectively, it is essential that the investigator have at her disposal
the full body of testimonies, a ‘full deck of cards’. With this as a first step, the essential and
relevant facts are then placed into a straightforward, yet synergetic system
that strips the sightings and the summaries regarding them of speculation,
interpretation or ‘invented explanations.’ The evidence has not been treated
this way in the past – in part because the reports were often so fragmentary
their value was elusive, especially when isolated one report from the
next. As long as each eyewitness report
is kept in a vacuum – written down and filed away without any expert’s analysis, and especially without placing it
in the context of the system and other reports – the process will be as it is
even now, slow-moving and relatively inert.
This report will show some of the
focal points that have emerged in my study from the 1945-1970 time period. (See Part III. CLUSTERS AND CONFLICTS). The
lack of testimonies from the 1971-2001
time period -- invaluable information that could eliminate and clarify
Wallenberg’s paper trail extending into the present era by bringing the later
sightings to bear against earlier conflicts in movement -- is again slowing
down the results. My goal is a report
that goes into the late Eighties – or beyond, if that is appropriate to the
actual facts of Raoul Wallenberg’s captivity in the
I must also add that preparing
these sightings to be included in the system has been time consuming. It is not enough to repeat what is written on
the page or pass a testimony on without question. In many cases, errors have been made not only
as a result of the witness’ memory but by officials compiling several versions
of the same report, so that details like date, corpus, cell number begin to
differ from each other. [7]
Not only does this confuse later investigators, but the witness’ credibility is
diminished almost immediately when it seems that he or she is stating one thing
one day and something else tomorrow. In
certain instances it can be shown that this is not the result of the
eyewitness’ uncertainty about the facts but of those handling their testimonies
altering them slightly through successive summaries.
Certainly, in retrospect and
out of context, the witness will be the one blamed for the error– not the
official who wrote down the report. The
end result of such summaries is that the facts have been essentially
disassociated from the most crucial points of information in the original
transcripts. The classic example of this
is the report that 26/28 Sebastapolsky Prospekt, a standard medical
institutional facility of the 70s with several floors and a hospital industrial
elevator where Albert Hollosy claims to have seen Wallenberg in a locked ward
on an upper floor in the Spring of 1981, was a ‘small house.’ But these divergences exist everywhere in the
material at hand – which necessitates the careful review of each report for the
resolution of such contradictions. To one who knows the system, and the place –
some of these divergences stand out quite readily because of the logic of the
system. (Fortunately, also, through the
Vladimir Corpus 2 computer system and my work in the prisoner files, we now
have enough data at our disposal to correct essential factors like cell numbers
or periods of occupancy so that we can proceed independent of what has been
written down by those who interviewed them but could not make sufficient sense
of the facts.)
While we can attribute these
mistakes to confusion on the part of the unknowing official in the West – the
fact remains that the failure to cluster the sightings and submit them as a
body of evidence has had tragic consequences for Raoul Wallenberg and other
Swedes in captivity. This will become very apparent when, in a
few months, the inter-related eyewitness testimonies (1945- 2001) stand on their own as a body of
evidence, in most instances, against the alleged 1947 death date. They will show that much of the mystery can
be, and could have been, resolved by taking very basic steps. At this point, lack of requisite action by
those responsible for Wallenberg’s return -- when acting on the evidence could
have made a critical difference to Wallenberg’s freedom -- will become a historical
fact. This cannot be confined to the
1945-47 period, or blamed on Soderblum alone.
Unless it can be proven that from an early point the Government of
Sweden was privileged to ‘verified knowledge’ that justified their failure to
respond, the fact that no effort was made to inter-relate the eyewitness
testimonies and present them to the Soviet Government or international courts
of law speaks for itself.
The question will then be asked
whether this ‘isolation’ of reports was a deliberate attempt to devaluate the
eyewitness testimonies. As I have noted
in “Only One Truth”, this could have been a conscious or unconscious response
to the strategy set into motion by the Gromyko Memorandum which states, without
proof, that a man named ‘Walenberg’ died in his cell in Lubyanka in
1947. For no sighting alone, no witness,
could withstand the impact of an official response from the Soviet Government.
Any witness coming forth after escaping or being repatriated to the West would
have to prove that the Soviet Government was lying, impossible without access
to the kind of documentation we are only beginning to study now.[8] In spite of the psychological challenges
generated by the Soviet denial, the report of two or more unrelated witnesses –
in many cases three to five – of Wallenberg in Inta or Verchne-Uralsk, are
quantitatively as valid as those of the primary witnesses (Richter, Loyda,
Pelkonen, Huber, Hille, Kitschman) who stated that they sat with Wallenberg and
Langfelder in Moscow prisons in 1945 or carried on wall tapping communications
until early 1947. Like the many reports
of Wallenberg still in Lubyanka/Lefortovo and/or Butyrka in late 1947, 1948 to
1952, they should have been addressed.
The fact that the Soviets seemingly refused to reopen discussions –
other than to foster a debate between Doctors Svartz and Myasnikow -- did not
help.
As
we are now at a time of improved
cooperation, I have tried to establish as many of these clusters as
possible before beginning our pilot with the Russian archivists – so neither
side need waste precious time and resources but can concentrate on the
fulfillment of a prepared list of specific requests. This I hope will eliminate or greatly reduce
the need to keep coming back to the Russian authorities to complete this
work. (See Pages 20 and 21 below).
3. The third factor contributing to the objectivity of the
current investigation is Susanne Berger’s study of what I refer to as “
Anonymous or Alternative Swedes.” [9]In
a Working Group Meeting in the early phase, a Russian military historian gave
the number of missing Swedes as, I believe, 110 – a surprisingly high account
if we compare it with the existing list.
Here, for example, the independent investigators are operating at a
disadvantage when they proceed with the premise that the only Swedish diplomat
with Red Cross connections involved in rescue work arrested in
In addition to Hunoldt’s report
on these three Swedes[13],
there are reports of one – and perhaps two other trios of Swedes.[14] The latter did not seem to have undergone
interrogation in
There exist also a number of
reports of encounters with single Swedes, including at least one journalist in
The discovery and partial identification
of the “alternative Swedes” whose profiles are similar to that of Wallenberg
enables us to now be more objective in our study. Previously, if a prisoner had a name close to
that of Wallenberg, this added considerable weight to the testimony, at least
if one believed that this referred only to
Raoul Wallenberg. In this light,
the request to the Russians for a) their list of Swedes taken and/or lost in
the Gulag; and b) for any prisoners whose name is or resembles that of
Wallenberg – (such as Van den berg) -- has considerably more urgency. An important starting point would be any and
all information on Rudolf Wallenberg, alleged to have died a prisoner in
It
stands to reason, from the ideal perspective of full Swedish-Russian
cooperation that both sides should provide lists, registration cards and, in
the Soviet case, prisoner files so that we can reconstruct the time, place and
movements of the various Swedes, especially those by the same or approximate
name, enabling us in short order to confine our search to those testimonies
which could in reality be Wallenberg.
In addition to those Swedes who
are identifiable, we have reports for a number of anonymous missing Swedes –
whose physical or biographical description help us to establish whether or not
they are Wallenberg. In at least eight
cases, we have reports referring to an official Swede affiliated either to a
particular legation or Red Cross or both.[20] Traditionally presumed to be Raoul
Wallenberg, these reports now may refer to at least three – and possibly six or
seven other Swedes.[21] It should be further noted that Vilmos
Langfelder, according to Huber, presented himself as a ‘Swedish diplomat’ in
1945 – meaning that he claimed the right to evoke that immunity. To the best of our knowledge,
Grossheim-Krisko (the center of the confusion around the Turin/Uibel versus
Brugger testimonies regarding Wallenberg’s presence in
There are at least two reports of
a Swede held secretly in Lubyanka, one in 1946 prior to the time period we
think Wallenberg became Prisoner Number 7 under investigation[23]
and the other in 1947-48. [24] In addition to this we have the pseudonymous
testimony of ‘ZAD’ who claims to have shared a cell with Wallenberg and Holosko
sometime between 1947 and 1949, also in Lubyanka or Lefortovo Prisons. ‘ZAD’ claims not only to have known Raoul
Wallenberg by name, but that Wallenberg shouted it in the corridor when he was
led away from their cell. We must also
acknowledge a growing number of reports of a Swedish diplomat in Butyrka prison
starting in 1945 and extending into the Fifties.
Sorting out these different
cases, particularly with the help of both Russian and Swedish authorities,
could do much to contribute to the objectivity of our investigation. In particular, the existence of such an
anonymous, strictly isolated Swede in Lubyanka/Lefortovo is a challenge to the
already complicated question of Raoul
Wallenberg’s disappearance, as opposed to execution, in 1947. Was there a man named ‘Walenberg’, first name
unknown, date of birth not necessarily the same, who died in his cell – or was
shot or killed by lethal injection -- in 1947?
Was another Wallenberg missing, a more prominent one held as a secret
numbered prisoner? Or, are the witnesses encountering another Swede after July
1947 who they later interpret to have been Wallenberg because of the belief
that this is the only Swede who is missing?
For our work to be conclusive, we must identify the ‘real Raoul.’
Policy
toward Missing Swedes
In short, we are no longer
dealing with the disappearance of ‘just
one man’ and a host of other reports that were automatically rejected –
psychologically because if the same prisoner was reported all over the former
USSR none might be true[25]
and investigatively because of conflicts
with the documents turned over to us by the Russians which did define
Wallenberg’s whereabouts. If we
consider the missing Swedes as a group, then reports that conflict with
Wallenberg’s known whereabouts enable us to define the movements of another
missing Swede. The important thing is to
recognize that the majority of these are not just ‘stories’ or, as they have
been mockingly referred to, ‘UFO sightings.’
As one witness commented when she acknowledged, upon seeing a photograph
of Raoul Wallenberg, ‘that is not the man’ she had treated in her clinic
in the Magadan Region: But he must be
somebody’s Swede.
That such a host did exist was
not a secret.[26] In March 1955, Gunnar Jarring as Chief of the
Political Section engaging the American government’s support on the question of
Wilfred Cumish’s sighting of Raoul Wallenberg as reported by Admiral Voss gave
some words of caution to the handling of this case to his American contact: Jarring
emphasized that the Wallenberg case is an extremely delicate one in
Swedish-Russian relations and they consider it important that the Russians do
not learn that the Swedes are continuing their investigation. He said that in the inquiries that they (the
Swedes) make, they never ask directly about any Swede who might be
imprisoned – and he hoped that in our inquiries we might do the same. (Emphasis mine).
The very ‘inspecific approach’ [27]
which Jarring described to the Americans in 1955, fortunately, was counteracted
in 1956 when the Swedish Government presented the notarized eyewitness reports
from the primary witnesses such as Richter, Huber, Hille, Kitschmann, Pelkonen,
Supprian, Rensinghoff, Starke, Bergmann, Wallenstein, von Hinkledey, and Di
Mohr – with astounding results, namely the reversal of the Vishinsky Memorandum
of 1947 denying that Wallenberg was to be found on Soviet territory.
Again I return to the question of why the Swedish Government did not
continue to present the evidence at their disposal when clearly they had
achieved a significant victory in eliciting a Soviet reversal? [28] This leads to a further question: If the
Swedish government in 1955 was hiding the fact that they were ‘continuing their
investigation’, threw caution to the
winds in 1956 when they presented the ‘primary testimonies’, did they quickly
bury it again in 1957 with the Gromyko Memorandum? How did this play out in practical and policy
terms? Did they revert to ‘generalities’ in placing their requests for information
related to all Swedes in the Gulag? Was
a decision made to separate the Wallenberg case from that of the other Swedes
so that they as a host were soon forgotten?
As for the Raoul Wallenberg case, until the Working Group, were
eyewitness reports other than Nanna Svartz –
presented at all – and if so, via formal or behind-the-scenes
channels? Were latter witnesses
dissuaded from coming forth or repeating their testimonies because of the
manner in which they were handled. These are questions that should be
considered by those responsible for evaluating the investigation.
II. METHODOLOGY AND RELATED ISSUES
Systemization of Information:
At the time of this writing, I have
entered 210 names/background/eyewitness reports into the computer system, of
which 188 refer to actual sightings of Raoul Wallenberg, a Swede or groups of
Swedes. Fifteen prisoner files from my
original study for the Swedish-Russian Working Group have been included for
detailing, information useful for determining transport or sources of other
records related to the various types of facilities.[29] Seven prisoner files offering some form of
analogy for analyzing the information are also included in this system[30]. There is some overlap between the latter two
groups.
I anticipate that the full group
of sightings for 1945-1970 period will be at least 300. I cannot estimate the final total after the
sightings for the 1971-Present stage have been added, but will note that the
following reports from the classified materials (1970-2001) have already been
entered into the system: Remenyi, Hollosy, Toma, Trunova, G. Schmidt,
Terelya/Razkalns, Sakayls, and Bruveris.
These were brought to my attention by Hans Magnusson, from working in
the Swedish files in May 2000 with the assistance of Daniel Larssen, or from
contributions from Dr. Guy von Dardel, Dr. Marvin Makinen and Susanne Berger. Of the overall group to date, at least ten
are original
The template which I am using to
prepare this information corresponds to very basic data on a Soviet prisoner
registration card,[31]
including also death and date/place of repatriation. In addition, further information is presented
showing the prisoner’s movements throughout the Gulag where known; related
witnesses or in certain cases who placed the report in the name of the alleged
source; as well as analysis of the sighting (what’s wrong with it),
cross-referencing where appropriate, and instructions on how to complete the
sighting and verify it.
The “Alternative Swede”
Where appropriate there is a
designation AS for “Alternative Swede,” meaning those who could
have been confused for Wallenberg. This
includes a number of Anonymous Swedes.
At the date of this writing, there are 82 instances out of the 210
entries. These include Swedes, Swedish
officials, diplomats or Red Cross workers, Swedish officers or flyers, persons
of other nationalities believed to be Swedish but not persons identified
as Raoul Wallenberg or Raoul. Please
note that my count does not incorporate the names that appear on the
Government’s list of Swedes missing in the Gulag. There may be overlaps in that different
witnesses offer a similar description for a Swede or group of Swedes in
different locations. Until we can
accurately identify these Swedes, this will be difficult to sort. Cooperation on the part of both Swedish and
Russian authorities could make a big difference in speeding up the
process.
General Discussion of
Sightings of Swedes by Location
From the list in progress which I
have compiled, combined with other sightings of Raoul Wallenberg, I have created a series of tables of prisons
or camps by name, where either Wallenberg or other Swedes were seen. I also have prepared a list of camps
according to their numerical designation (not always confined to Swedes) for
those locations that have no name. Both
lists – wherever possible – establish
the region. Establishing the appropriate
regional authority for each camp is being done on the basis of information in
the prisoner files, maps at my disposal here with the added help of my team in
Many of these locations do not
appear in A. Shifrin, The First Guidebook to Prisons and Concentration Camps
of the Soviet Union, (Bantam Books, 1982) so the specialized nature of our
research is already beginning to yield a new paradigm. The reason I believe many of these camps do
not appear in Shifrin is that they housed foreign prisoners, as opposed to
Russians, and/or special units within the camps, heavily guarded and surrounded
by barbed wire, to separate their designated prisoners from the more open
units. Many of these camps located just
outside the growing urban areas were dismantled by the mid-Fifties with special
prisoners being moved to prisons, hospitals or more rural facilities. (See testimonies of Babko, referring to a
camp outside
A third reason for the secrecy
pertaining to some of these sites is the nature of their projects and the
Soviets’ determination that no word or important information regarding them
should leak to the West. A tragic – and
extreme – example of this predates the Wallenberg disappearance – but is no
doubt of concern to the Swedish Government.
At the end of June –
beginning of July 1941, during the massive repression against prisoners by the
NKVD (town of
Labor
Divisions
Ultimately the template will have
to be redesigned to include other relevant information which recurrently has
contributed to our analysis, but which wasn’t understood at the point of the
original design. (May-October 2001). One
example of this came through the file of Rudolph Hamburger and in relation to
the Tamvelius report of Wallenberg in Inta as confirmed by Heinz Pannwitz. Hamburger, like Wallenberg, was a trained
architect; he was also an Engineer.
Special designations were used to show his movements from camp to camp –
not in terms of the camps per se, although this appears elsewhere – but the
Building and Construction Unit[33]. Similarly, records of the
construction-assembly department of the Omsukchan Mining Administration (prior
to 1950-Dalstroi Construct Site No. 43) in the Magadan Regions, under ideal
circumstances could be used to trace the movements of one Pattersson or
Petersson, described by Vasily Zinkin as ‘a foreign diplomat, believed to be in
one of the intelligence services, captured at the end of the War.’ [34]
In terms of the Tamvelius sighting
of Wallenberg in Inta which was confirmed by Pannwitz, Klausch, Kalousa and
separately by Kalianski (not Kalinski), two problems had to be solved. Inta, or
Special Camp No. 1, was multi-faceted.
Some of the prisoners worked in the mines of
Tamvelius as an engineer was
already working in this division. The fact
that Raoul Wallenberg was a trained architect would further support the
possibility that he was also assigned to that detail, where he was visited by
Tamvelius – as a ‘fellow Swede’ in the hospital. Kalianski in turn confirms the presence of
the Swede he believes to be Wallenberg who was already in the hospital barracks
when he entered in March 1949. Kalianski
states that in January the whole barracks was moved to Abez, the man he
believes to be Wallenberg included. As
the Swedish government testimonies give a code name of GMOSER for this Swede,
it is hard to proceed without further information that specifically refers to
the original text. All matters
pertaining to this and related sightings should be declassified to further this
investigation.
‘Socially Dangerous’ versus
‘Especially Dangerous State Criminals.’
Another tool particularly useful
to Transport Studies is the term “Especially Dangerous State Criminal” versus
the more common ‘socially dangerous’, implying an influence of ideas without a
past criminal or war criminal record.
These two categories were frequently applied to foreign prisoners as
well as to Russians and could determine mode of transport (open convoy as
opposed to ‘enforced’ or special transports for the ‘especially dangerous.’)
and degree of isolation. Unfortunately,
because of their similarity in name, the two are often mistaken or substituted
one for the other, even by clerks in the Gulag.
However, they should not be. “Socially dangerous’, while it can also exist
as a ‘type without direction of an article’, is a charge, Article 37-5 – the
basis for a sentence. Persons with this
charge, such as Rivo, may be sent into exile or to more open labor camps where
they are nonetheless monitored for their speech and behavior. If their behavior proves disruptive, further
charges might be laid against them, such as anti-Soviet agitation, so that
their sentences are prolonged. Among the
prisoners of war and interned, both the ‘typing’ and ‘charge’ of
socially-dangerous might be given.
Rudolph Hamburger who was himself an NKVD agent abroad – i.e. did many
favors for the Soviet military – was labeled “Socially Dangerous” simply
because of his cosmopolitan mentality, which earned him a lot of trouble with
officials and workers in the GULAG system.
“Especially Dangerous State
Criminals” is an important category applied in the selection of prisoners and
choice of where they would be sent after sentencing to isolate or contain
them. In special cases, like that of
Jankowski or Konoye, this category might prove to be grounds for prolonging
detention even after the completion of term.
In extreme cases it might prove relevant to an ‘execution.’ All of the
prisoners associated with the ‘contingent’ of which Wallenberg was originally a
part were reviewed as potentially “Especially Dangerous State Criminals.” There is yet another distinction between
“Especially Dangerous “ and “War Criminal” or “Fascist War Criminal” which was
used to explain the ongoing isolation of prisoners who remained in prison
isolation after so many especially dangerous and Nazi war criminals had been
returned under the Khrushchev- Adenauer treaty.
Such prisoners were noticed in the Eighties and early Nineties in places
like
According to the Decree of the
Council of Ministers USSR No. 416-159 of 21 February 1948 on “Organization of
Camps and Prisons to Hold Especially Dangerous Categories of Criminals,” Special
MVD prisons, the Vladimirovsk, Aleksandrovsk and Verkhneuralsk were established
to hold spies, diversionists, terrorists, Trotskyites, right-wingers,
Mensheviks, socialist revolutionaries, anarchists, nationalists, White
emigrants and members of other anti-Soviet groups considered dangerous.
Holding others is forbidden.
(Emphasis mine). [36] The prisons, of course, were pre-existing;
the shift is in the designation of certain prisoners as ‘especially dangerous’
and the secrecy and isolation that was imposed upon them. By like token, special camps were created
through a joint MVD, MGB and General Procurator order 16 March 1948 to isolate
“especially dangerous criminals” from the rest of the criminal population. According to General Yu. I. Kalinin, these
included:
Special
Special
Special
Special
Special
These camps, I know from the
prisoners files, were vast and included a number of different camps within
camps. Spread out over large territories
or regions they could incorporate portions of towns, remote villages in
addition to their own sprawling infrastructure.
For example, in the files of the Polish witnesses, it is very hard to
tell the difference in administration between Ozerny and facilities in the Amur
region. Even though long transports were
required in between, sometimes it appears as if the administration in that
portion to the East is one.
According to Susanne Berger in
her report of January 2001, Special Camp No. 7 – Ozerny – attained special camp
status on March 24, 1949, before Raoul Wallenberg allegedly arrived in
Angara/Bratsk (the earlier name of the camp unit) toward the end of that year,
as described by Polish prisoners Baj, Chichoki and Kowalski. Ms. Berger also
cites a letter from a Deputy Commander of Special Camp No. 7, Marin, to the
Deputy Commander of the GULAG, Colonel Bulanov dated December 31, 1949 which is
especially relevant in explaining the alleged communication which was allowed
to develop between the Poles and ‘Raoul Wallenberg.’ Isolation of especially
dangerous state criminals from the earlier group of the prisoners has not been
fully completed as of now, for reasons I mentioned earlier in my memo.”
Another letter from Colonel Bulanov
to the Commander of Special Camp No. 7, Yevstigneev, dated March 23, 1950
states: It is evident from the minutes of the meetings held in Special Camp
No. 7 that isolation and regime of keeping especially dangerous state criminals
do not meet the requirements of the orders of MVD SSR…Until now the contacts
between the special contingent and unguarded prisoners has not been stopped.” As
these two letters would seem to coincide with the arrival and departure of
Raoul Wallenberg from Special Camp No. 7, one may assume that lack of proper
security is a motive for forwarding Wallenberg toward Special Camp No. 5
(Magadan). As we have Kowalski’s
transport slip from his file for the transport East which he claims to have
shared with Wallenberg, we can proceed further with this sighting.
III.
CLUSTERS AND
CONFLICTS
For the sake of clarity and
structure, I have generated a series of Tables, designated by regions, with the
various eye-witness reports listed in chronological fashion. These tables include key descriptive phrases
by the witnesses, with discussion of the more complex or controversial aspects
of the testimony listed in the footnotes. There has been as yet no
elimination of any of the eyewitness reports at our disposal, first because
the issue of “Alternative Swedes” leaves the question open as to whether the
witness had met another Swede whom he assumed to be Raoul Wallenberg. I have however made every effort to check the
details and correct them where real data is already at our disposal. Secondly, I work on the assumption until
proven otherwise that – like Soviet disinformation – there is always a grain of
truth to the reports which must be preserved for the system as a whole. Rather than ‘throwing the baby out with the
bathwater’ – the sightings stand until access to the necessary records is given
to properly evaluate them. Please note
that certain of these tables give transport dates as markers relevant to this
particular study. Information related to
them will be presented in the fuller report in a few months.
As can be seen through a study of
these tables, all of whom are ‘in progress,’ there are conflicts not
only between individual testimonies but entire clusters of reports which must
be resolved. These will be discussed in
my later report, after some verification through the transport records has been
possible and after we have seen if we can identify another Swede under the
jurisdiction of the other region of facility, thus narrowing the search for
Wallenberg. For the present time,
emphasis rests on the facts that there exists considerably more clusters than
had been previously acknowledged and that the existence of such clusters –
particularly from diverse sources – would indicate that there is somebody present
in that place and time who either is or has been mistaken for Raoul
Wallenberg. This is no longer a
hypothetical situation, but one which must be resolved in real terms.[38]
1946-1948
Three sightings in which Raoul Wallenberg is being interrogated in
Lwow,
1947
Two sightings from Russians reporting Raoul Wallenberg’s presence in
Vladimir.[Could be same source, Shulgin, or both Shulgin and Kutepov
who
arrived together on the transport from
-1953
Spring 1947 Sixteen sightings of Wallenberg, (Van den Berg, Wallberg,
Waldenberg),
1951/54 a Swede,
Swedish Red Cross official, Swedish diplomat in camps in the Komi SSR. [Four
testimonies confirming Tamvelius, otherwise diverse.]
1947/1948 Eighteen
sightings of Wallenberg, a Swede or a foreign diplomat arrested
1954 in
1952-1954
Eight sightings of Wallenberg or a Swede at Verchne Uralsk
Isolation
prison. [5 diverse reports and related witnesses]
1952-54 Two sightings of Langfelder in Vladimir Prison. [Diverse
sources]
1954 Three sightings of Wallenberg in Vladimir
Prison [Diverse sources
although Cumish appears in both this
instance and the above].
1955 Four
sightings of Wallenberg in Vladimir Prison [of which two come from
Kalinski. This does not include the report of Larina which could however cover
also this time period.)
1955/56 Two
sightings by civilians in the
1960-62 Three
sightings of Raoul Wallenberg or an unknown foreign national in
1960-70 Thirteen
sightings of Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, Van den Berg, or an
anonymous prisoner either whose nationality is unknown or a White Russian ‘war
criminal’ in Vladimir [Four
conceivably could be traced to one source but the rest are diverse. Includes no
reports by Kalinski.]
1977-92 Thirteen
sightings related to closed wards in psychiatric clinics, safe houses and
closed community in the former USSR. [All diverse.]
SEE TABLES ATTACHED.